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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines union wage premiums by occupation in the public sector in the U.S. for the 
2000-2004 period.  In examining union-nonunion wage differences for public sector workers in 
occupations accounting for 66 percent of all public workers in the 2000-2004 Current Population 
Survey, we find positive and statistically significant union premiums for 27 out of 41 occupations 
examined.  We also find large differences among occupations, with miscellaneous teachers and 
instructors receiving a 61 percent premium, secretaries and administrative assistants receiving a 
5 percent premium, and 14 occupations receiving no statistically significant premium.  In 
comparing union premiums by occupation between the private and public sectors, we find, in most 
cases, that private sector premiums are larger than public sector premiums.  Finally, an Oaxaca 
decomposition shows that the majority of the differential between private sector union premiums 
and public sector union premiums appears to be due to differences in the way unions reward 
workers in the private and public sectors, not because of differences in the types of workers in the 
private and public sectors. 
 
Keywords:  Public Sector Union Wage Premiums 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ntil recently, most research examining the effects of unions on wages in the U.S. has been in the private 
sector.  However, several recent statistics regarding union membership in the U.S. suggest increased 
importance of examining these effects in the public sector.  For example, while the share of private sector 
wage and salaried workers that are unionized has declined from 16.8 percent in 1983 to 7.2 percent in 2009, the 
share of public sector workers that are unionized has remained constant, at 36.7 percent in 1983 and 37.4 percent in 
2009 (BLS).  Furthermore, although the majority of unionized workers have historically been in the private sector 
(nearly 68 percent in 1983 according to Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004), the majority are now in the public sector 
(52 percent in 2009 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics).  These numbers suggest that an understanding of 
union wage effects requires a better understanding of the effects of unions on wages in the public sector.   
 
A recent study by Bahrami, Bitzan, and Leitch (2009) provides several important findings regarding the 
role of unions in wage determination in the public sector in the U.S.  First, there are persistent and consistent union 
wage premiums in the public sector between 1998 and 2004.  Second, union wage premiums measured using a wage 
equation that allows for different union rewards for different personal characteristics results in higher measured 
premiums than those obtained with a traditional union wage equation that only measures the premium with an 
intercept shift.  Third, there are substantial differences in union premiums for different types of workers – e.g. local 
workers receive higher union premiums than state workers, who in turn receive higher union premiums than federal 
workers; blue collar workers receive higher union premiums than white collar workers; part time workers receive 
higher union premiums than full time workers; female workers receive higher union premiums than male workers; 
and black workers receive higher union premiums than white workers.  Finally, a large difference between the union 
wage premium in the private and public sectors still exists (22.7 percent in the private sector and 11.2 percent in the 
public sector), and much of it is explained by differences in public and private sector worker characteristics (40 to 
50 percent).  Specifically 22 to 30 percent of the difference in private-public sector union premiums is due to a much 
larger proportion of public sector workers in white collar occupations in comparison to the private sector, and 17 to 
U 
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36 percent is due to a negative union premium for education and a lower level of education in the private sector.  
Moreover, large portions of the difference are also explained by higher union rewards for experience, for being full 
time, and for being male in the private sector in comparison to the public sector, while large negative portions of the 
difference are explained by lower union premiums in the private sector for education, residence in a metropolitan 
area, and for white collar occupations. 
 
While the findings provide additional insight into public sector union premiums in the U.S., they also leave 
many unanswered questions.  Some of these questions include:  (1) are public sector union wage premiums 
persistent across occupations?, (2) how do union wage premiums vary by occupation within the public sector?, (3) 
are private sector union premiums higher than public sector union premiums across all occupations?, and (4) can we 
explain more of the gap between private sector union premiums and public sector union premiums when looking at 
specific occupations? 
 
This study addresses these questions by examining public sector union premiums for workers in every 
occupation that accounts for at least .5 percent of all public sector workers between 2000 and 2004 in the Current 
Population Survey.  These occupations account for more than 66 percent of all U.S. public sector workers over this 
period.  Specifically, we estimate union premiums by occupation during this period, compare these premiums to 
those for the same occupations in the private sector, and perform an Oaxaca (Oaxaca 1973) decomposition to 
estimate the percentages of the differences in private-public sector union premiums that are explained by differences 
in worker characteristics and those that are explained by differences in the ways workers are rewarded for their 
characteristics by unions in the private and public sectors.  We find positive union wage premiums in most public 
sector occupations, substantial variation in these premiums, higher union wage premiums in the private sector than 
in the public sector for most occupations, and most of the difference between private sector and public sector union 
premiums attributable to differences in the way unions reward workers in the private and public sectors, rather than 
due to differences in worker characteristics between private and public sectors.  The next section provides a review 
of the literature regarding the impacts of unionization on wages in the public sector.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Several studies have examined union wage premiums in the public sector.  However, most of these studies 
have either examined union premiums in the public sector overall, or examined union premiums in a specific 
occupation.  Very few studies have examined union premiums by occupation for more than one occupation. 
 
One of the few exceptions is Blanchflower and Bryson (2004), who examine union wage premiums in the 
public sector and compare them to the private sector.  They find that union premiums have increased in the public 
sector since the late 1970s/early 1980s (13.3 percent average premium between 1979 and 1988, and 14.5 percent 
average premium between 1996 and 2001).  In contrast, they find a decrease in union premiums in the private sector 
(22 percent between 1979 and 1988, and 17 percent between 1996 and 2001).  In examining union premiums for 
specific occupations, they find an increase in the wage premium for teachers, lawyers, firefighters, and police over 
time, with little change in the premium for registered nurses and social workers over time.  Other changes they note 
are a decline in the union wage premium for young workers and less educated workers, a slight increase in public 
sector union wage premium for men and a slight decrease for women.  In identifying current union wage premiums 
in the public sector, they find that premiums are highest for local government workers and lowest for federal 
government workers.  They also find the wage benefits of union membership are greatest for manual workers, the 
young, and the least educated. 
 
 One study that examines public union wages and employment in some specific occupations is Valletta 
(1993).  In a cross-sectional analysis, Valletta (1993) finds positive union contract effects on firefighter/sanitation 
employment and wages for 900 U.S. cities between 1977 and 1980.  This is consistent with demand shifts due to 
union political influence in municipal bargaining.  However, when using a longitudinal analysis, his results provide 
little support for the demand shift hypothesis.   
 
Zax and Ichniowski (1988) use data on 500 municipalities to analyze the effects of public unions on 
employment and pay levels. Their study shows that municipal unions use a mix of strategies that rely on collective 
bargaining and political lobbying that increases employment and compensation in the bargaining unit.  Ashenfelter 
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(1970) studies the effect of unionization on wages of firemen by a random sample of cities.  He finds that 
unionization of firemen may have raised the average hourly wage of unionized firemen by somewhere between 6 to 
16 percent above what it would have been without unionization. 
 
 Several other studies also find public sector union wage premiums, including Bellante and Long 1981; 
Venti 1987; Kruger 1988; Moore and Raisian 1991; Moore and Newman 1991; and Choudhury 1994, cited in 
Mueller 2000.  Much of the evidence on the impacts of unions on wages in the public sector is captured in a review 
article by Lewis (1990).  He reviews 75 studies of public sector unions’ effects on wages and concludes that the 
public-sector wage-gap studies generally find the public-sector average wage gain for unionized employees is 
smaller compared to the private sector.  He argues that these studies had not taken into account the differences in 
public and private sectors regarding (1) fringe benefits, (2) threat or spillover effects, (3) work force mix (blue-collar 
versus white collar workers), and (4) trends in the estimated wage gain.  After a simple adjustment for these factors, 
he concludes that the public sector union premium is lower than the private sector union premium by about 3 to 7 
percentage points.  Moreover, in examining whether the public sector union wage premium is changing relative to 
the private sector union wage premium, he finds that from 1973 to 1984 the public sector union wage premium 
moved approximately parallel to that in all sectors (private and public sectors combined).  His estimate shows that 
the public sector union wage premium from 1973 to 1984 averaged about 8 to 12 percent.  Within the public sector, 
his findings indicate that the mean union wage gain is lowest for federal employees and is highest for local 
government workers.   
 
Freeman and Ichniowski (1988) show that overall, research findings suggest that average public sector 
union wage gains are about 5 percent less than private sector union wage gains. However, unionized local 
government workers in the public sector obtain as large or larger earnings differences over nonunion workers as do 
unionized private sector workers (Freeman and Ichniowski, 1988, p.6).  It can be argued that the impact of unions on 
wages in the public sector (especially at the local level) depends on a set of complex variables, including the ability 
of public workers to strike, the size of government departments, the ability of the local governments to pay (as 
reflected in the property values in the community and average family incomes), and hosts of other factors - each 
requiring a separate investigation. The next section describes the data used in this study. 
 
DATA 
 
This study uses the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
from 2000 through 2004.  Data include variables such as earnings, hours of work, educational level, union 
membership, gender, race, region of employment, age, part-time and full-time status, and class of worker.  Data 
prior to 2000 are not used because occupational codes change between 1999 and 2000.   
 
We estimate union wage premiums for every public sector occupation that accounts for at least .5 percent 
of all workers in the CPS sample over the 2000 through 2004 period.  Table 1 shows the number of worker 
observations in the private and public sectors in these occupations before eliminating outliers and observations with 
missing data.  As the table shows, these occupations account for 103,805 observations in the public sector (66 
percent of all observations in the public sector between 2000 and 2004) and 197,118 observations in the private 
sector.   
 
We eliminate observations where estimated hourly earnings are below $5.15 or over $200
1
, observations 
where hourly earnings cannot be estimated using weekly earnings and usual hours of work due to missing data, 
observations where implied experience is negative, and observations with ages over 70 years.  In some instances, the 
CPS assigns earnings where they are missing using a variety of procedures.  These observations with allocated 
earnings are also deleted.
2
  After eliminating these outliers and observations with missing data, there are 61,570 
observations in the public sector and 105,107 observations in the private sector. 
                                                 
1 $5.15 was the federal minimum wage over this time period.  Hourly earnings are estimated as earnings per week divided by 
usual weekly hours.  
2 Eliminating observations where earnings or hours are allocated reduces the number of observations to 73,568.  After eliminating 
observations where hourly earnings are below $5.15 or over $200, the number of observations drops to 62,166.  Finally, 
eliminating observations where experience is negative or age is over 70 reduces observations to 61,750. 
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Table 1:  Number of public and private sector workers by occupation in the 2000-2004 CPS 
(Top Public Sector Occupations) 
Occupation Public Private 
Elementary and middle school teachers 16,330 2,401 
Secondary school teachers 7,100 1,121 
Secretaries and administrative assistants 6,272 20,643 
Teacher Assistants 5,206 1,574 
Postsecondary teachers 5,044 2,641 
Janitors and building cleaners 4,528 11,067 
Police and sheriff's patrol officers 4,202 0 
Managers, all other 3,807 13,308 
Education administrators 3,158 1,727 
Postal service mail carriers 2,593 0 
Social workers 2,528 1,704 
Bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers 2,523 0 
Special education teachers 2,423 272 
Registered nurses 2,333 12,001 
Counselors 2,213 1,785 
Bus drivers 2,120 1,979 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support workers 2,008 8,703 
Office clerks, general 1,907 4,711 
Fire fighters 1,831 45 
Lawyers, judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers 1,519 3,457 
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 1,517 10,191 
Accountants and auditors 1,515 8,785 
Preschool and kindergarten teachers 1,495 2,447 
Cooks 1,419 12,769 
Child care workers 1,370 5,269 
Postal service clerks 1,323 0 
Grounds maintenance workers 1,294 5,868 
Miscellaneous community and social service specialists 1,213 549 
Other teachers and instructors 1,191 2,184 
Receptionists and information clerks 1,165 8,962 
Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 1,150 3,714 
Librarians 1,112 360 
Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 1,059 4,792 
Office and administrative support workers, all other 1,046 2,768 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 1,046 21,273 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 991 9,556 
Word processors and typists 877 1,739 
Data entry keyers 867 3,562 
Postal service mail sorters, processors, and processing machine operators 853 0 
Personal and home care aides 834 3,187 
First-line supervisors/managers of police and detectives 823 4 
 
 
Measuring Union Wage Premiums by Occupation in the Public Sector 
 
 Most previous studies have estimated union wage premiums in the public sector by using a standard human 
capital wage equation, with a dummy variable for union membership: 
 
 
i
iiun XUNW ln   (1) 
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where: 
 
W = hourly earnings
3
, 
UN = union membership dummy, and 
Xi = Vector of human capital and other characteristics. 
 
However, Bahrami, Bitzan, and Leitch (2009) show that union wage premiums estimated with this 
approach are lower in comparison to those estimated with a human capital wage equation that accounts for 
differences in rewards to education, experience, and other characteristics for union and non-union workers.  The 
general wage equation used is: 
 
  
i
ii
i
iiun XUNXUNWln  (2) 
Separate wage equations are estimated for each occupation in the 2000-2004 time period, using occupations 
that account for at least .5 percent of workers from the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups.  The specific wage equation used for each occupation is: 
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Where: 
 
UN = Dummy Variable for Union Membership, 
Exper  =  Implied Experience (Age-Educ-6), 
Educ  = Imputed years of education from NBER, 
FT = Dummy for Full Time Status, 
SMSA = Dummy for residence in SMSA, 
White = Dummy for white, 
Black = Dummy for black, 
Male = Dummy for male, 
Regi = Regional Dummies, and 
Xj = vector of previous explanatory variables.  
Yeark = yearly dummies 
 
Parameter estimates from these equations are used with average characteristics of public sector workers 
within each occupation to obtain estimates of union wage premiums by occupation.  For example, the union wage 
premium for public-sector elementary teachers is estimated using the parameter estimates from a wage equation for 
public sector elementary teachers and the characteristics of the average public-sector elementary teacher.  This 
provides an estimate of the union wage premium by occupation that considers the average characteristics of workers 
in each occupation and the unique union effect by occupation.  
 
 In the 41 occupational regressions, there are many interaction terms that are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, suggesting that the rewards to human capital and other characteristics are not the same for union and 
nonunion workers.  While not consistent in direction or significance among occupations, union workers in the public 
sector receive different returns for education, implied experience, being full time, male, white, black, male, and 
                                                 
3 Hourly earnings are defined as earnings per week divided by usual weekly hours.  Hourly wages are deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index for all Urban Consumers. 
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living in a metropolitan area than non-union workers.  The lack of consistency in direction and significance of 
interaction terms among equations suggest more accurate estimates of union premiums by occupation are obtained 
using the occupation specific regressions. 
 
 Table 2 shows the estimated union wage premiums for workers in different occupations in the public 
sector, along with standard errors.  As the table shows, the estimated union wage premium is positive for 36 out of 
the 41 occupations and 27 occupations have estimated premiums that are statistically significant.   
 
 
Table 2:  Estimated Union Wage Premiums by Occupation in the Public Sector 
Occupation 
Log Premium 
(Standard Error) 
Other teachers and instructors 
0.4789* 
(0.1352) 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 
0.4339* 
(0.1133) 
Grounds maintenance workers 
0.4268* 
(0.1029) 
Postal service mail sorters, processors, and processing machine operators 
0.3325* 
(0.0916) 
Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 
0.2970* 
(0.1095) 
Janitors and building cleaners 
0.2811* 
(0.0378) 
Preschool and kindergarten teachers 
0.2695* 
(0.0774) 
Librarians 
0.2694* 
(0.0911) 
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 
0.2481* 
(0.0754) 
Postal service mail carriers 
0.2474* 
(0.0494) 
Elementary and middle school teachers 
0.2430* 
(0.0217) 
Personal and home care aides 
0.2325** 
(0.1144) 
Postal service clerks 
0.2199* 
(0.0647) 
Police and sheriff's patrol officers 
0.2188* 
(0.0412) 
Fire fighters 
0.2119*** 
(0.1088) 
Secondary school teachers 
0.2007* 
(0.0312) 
Office and administrative support workers, all other 
0.1894*** 
(0.1070) 
Bus drivers 
0.1758* 
(0.0539) 
Bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers 
0.1740* 
(0.0438) 
Teacher Assistants 
0.1690* 
(0.0271) 
Office clerks, general 
0.1564** 
(0.0614) 
Counselors 
0.1534* 
(0.0467) 
Cooks 
0.1494* 
(0.0509) 
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Table 2:  Estimated Union Wage Premiums by Occupation in the Public Sector 
Occupation 
Log Premium 
(Standard Error) 
Data entry keyers 
0.1461*** 
(0.0754) 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 
0.1273 
(0.0863) 
Word processors and typists 
0.1266*** 
(0.0748) 
Social workers 
0.1227* 
(0.0354) 
Receptionists and information clerks 
0.0818 
(0.0861) 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support workers 
0.0720 
(0.0505) 
Special education teachers 
0.0661 
(0.0467) 
Secretaries and administrative assistants 
0.0521** 
(0.0246) 
Child care workers 
0.0438 
(0.0847) 
Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 
0.0377 
(0.0751) 
Miscellaneous community and social service specialists 
0.0264 
(0.0735) 
Registered nurses 
0.0145 
(0.0444) 
Postsecondary teachers 
0.0010 
(0.0375) 
Managers, all other 
-0.0061 
(0.0441) 
Accountants and auditors 
-0.0118 
(0.0533) 
Education administrators 
-0.0232 
(0.0370) 
First-line supervisors/managers of police and detectives 
-0.0450 
(0.0943) 
Lawyers, judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers 
-0.0643 
(0.0624) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at the 1 percent level. 
**significant at the 5 percent level. 
***significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
 
 While most occupations show positive premiums, there is wide variation in the magnitude of the estimated 
premiums.  As the table shows, the estimated union premium ranges from negative 6 percent to positive 61 percent.
4
  
However, none of the negative premiums are statistically significant.  Examples of occupations with large union 
wage premiums include mail sorters, ground maintenance workers, driver/sales workers and truck drivers, and other 
teachers and instructors.  Occupations with smaller positive union premiums include secretaries and administrative 
assistants, social workers, and word processors/typists.  Occupations with no significant union premiums include 
lawyers, police supervisors, education administrators, accountants, and nurses. 
 
 As highlighted previously, Bahrami, et. al (2009) found that the union wage premium was much larger in 
the private sector than in the public sector.  In order to see whether this is true across occupations, we estimate the 
                                                 
4 For example, the wage premium for other teachers and instructors is e.4789 – 1 = .61 or 61%. 
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same model as above for each of the same occupations for which observations exist in the private sector (34 
regressions).   
 
Just as in the public sector, there are significant differences in the ways union workers are compensated for 
education, implied experience, location in a metropolitan area, full time status, race, and sex, in comparison to the 
way nonunion workers are compensated for these same characteristics in the private sector.  Moreover, as in the 
public sector, the union premiums for such characteristics vary by occupation in the private sector. 
 
Table 3 shows union premiums for private sector and public sector workers in the 41 occupations 
highlighted in Table 1.  As the table shows, union wage premiums are higher for private sector workers in 22 of the 
34 occupations for which there are both private and public sector workers.  Moreover, in some cases these 
differences are large – the log union wage premium for private data entry workers exceeds that for public data entry 
workers by .23, the log union wage premium for private special education teachers exceeds that for public special 
education teachers by .21, the log union wage premium for private registered nurses exceeds that for public 
registered nurses by .15, the log union wage premium for private cooks exceeds that for public cooks by .14, and all 
of these differences are statistically significant.  Furthermore, the log union wage premium for private sector 
workers exceeds that for public sector workers by at least .05 for 16 of the 34 occupations.  
 
Oaxaca Decomposition of Differences in Private – Public Sector Union Premiums 
 
 A variant of the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is used to help understand why the union wage premium is 
generally larger in the private sector than in the public sector.  The standard Oaxaca decomposition is a method for 
separating the total earnings gap between two groups into two portions; one portion is explained by differences in 
personal characteristics, and the other is due to differences in estimated coefficients between the two groups.   
 
 We attempt to explain differences in the union wage premiums for various occupations between the private 
and public sectors using a general version of the Oaxaca decomposition introduced by Neumark (1988).
 5
  The total 
difference in the union wage premium between the private and public sectors is: 
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This difference can be explained by differences in characteristics between the average private and public 
sector worker, and by differences between the rewards to those characteristics in the private and public sectors, as 
follows: 
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The first term on the right-hand side shows the portion of the difference between private union and public 
union wage premiums due to differences in the average characteristics of private and public workers.  The second 
term on the right hand side shows the portion of the difference that is due to differences in the rewards to personal 
characteristics for union members in the private and public sectors. 
                                                 
5 Using a model of discrimination due to employer preferences, he shows that if employer utility functions with respect to each 
type of labor is homogenous of degree zero, then the common wage structure can be estimated using the full sample.  This study 
estimates the common wage structure using OLS on the combined sample. 
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In addition to showing the difference between union premiums in the private and public sectors, Table 3 
shows the explained and unexplained portions of the difference as estimated using an Oaxaca decomposition.
6
 
7
  As 
the table shows, in most cases the majority of the difference between union premiums in the private sector and in the 
public sector is due to differences in the way unions reward various characteristics.  However, many of the measured 
differences due to the way unions reward characteristics in the private and public sectors are not statistically 
significant (only 5 out of 28 are significant).  On the other hand, although small percentages of the differences 
between union premiums in the private and public sectors are explained by difference in private-public sector 
worker characteristics, more of these differences are statistically significant (13 out of 28).  However, in 6 of the 13 
cases where differences are statistically significant, a negative portion of the gap is explained.  In cases where the 
union premium is higher in the private sector than in the public sector, this would suggest that based on personal 
characteristics workers from the public sector would get a higher premium than they would in the private sector if 
unions rewarded workers in both sectors in the same way.  That is, such differences actually support the idea that the 
difference in union premiums in the two sectors is due to the way workers are rewarded rather than due to 
differences in the characteristics of workers in the two sectors. 
 
 
Table 3:  Differences in Private-Public Sector Union Premiums and Percentages Explained by Differences in Worker 
Characteristics and How Unions Reward Workers in the Private and Public Sectors 
 
Log Union Premium 
Percent of Difference Explained 
By: 
Occupation Private Public 
Diff 
(std. err.)# 
Characteristics 
Log Diff 
(standard error) 
Percent 
Rewards 
Log Diff 
(standard 
error) 
Percent 
Child care workers 0.4124 0.0438 0.3686 NA NA 
Data entry keyers 0.3777 0.1461 
0.2317* 
(0.0352) 
-0.0310* 
(0.0118) 
-13.4% 
0.2627** 
(0.1076) 
113.4% 
Education administrators 0.2022 -0.0232 0.2253 NA NA 
Special education teachers 0.2740 0.0661 
0.2079* 
(0.0546) 
0.0387* 
(0.0106) 
18.6% 
0.1692 
(0.4784) 
81.4% 
Registered nurses 0.1682 0.0145 
0.1538* 
(0.0161) 
0.0047 
(0.0060) 
3.0% 
0.1491** 
(0.0588) 
97.0% 
Cooks 0.2910 0.1494 
0.1416*** 
(0.0812) 
-0.0094 
(0.0265) 
-6.6% 
0.1510*** 
(0.0777) 
106.6% 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing 
clerks 0.2614 0.1273 
0.1342* 
(0.0287) 
-0.0198 
(0.0113) 
-14.8% 
0.1540 
(0.1291) 
114.8% 
Postsecondary teachers 0.1274 0.0010 
0.1264** 
(0.0503) 
0.0312** 
(0.0136) 
24.7% 
0.0952 
(0.0948) 
75.3% 
Bus drivers 0.3000 0.1758 
0.1242* 
(0.0268) 
0.0118 
(0.0099) 
9.5% 
0.1124 
(0.1134) 
90.5% 
Teacher Assistants 0.2631 0.1690 
0.0941* 
(0.0379) 
-0.0162*** 
(0.0094) 
-17.2% 
0.1104 
(0.0982) 
117.2% 
                                                 
6 Oaxaca decompositions could not be performed for some occupations, as the private sector did not have observed values of 
some variables.  For example, all private sector lawyers in unions are also in metropolitan areas.  In this case including 
SMSAxUN and UN results in perfect collinearity. 
7 Standard errors are estimated using the approach introduced by Oaxaca and Ransom (1998). 
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Table 3:  Differences in Private-Public Sector Union Premiums and Percentages Explained by Differences in Worker 
Characteristics and How Unions Reward Workers in the Private and Public Sectors 
 
Log Union Premium 
Percent of Difference Explained 
By: 
Preschool and kindergarten teachers 0.3545 0.2695 0.0850 NA NA 
Secondary school teachers 0.2841 0.2007 
0.0834* 
(.0204) 
0.0138* 
(0.0047) 
16.6% 
0.0695 
(0.0817) 
83.4% 
Word processors and typists 0.2051 0.1266 
0.0785 
(0.0551) 
0.0147 
(0.0273) 
18.7% 
0.0638 
(0.1352) 
81.3% 
Social workers 0.1967 0.1227 
0.0741** 
(0.0368) 
0.0064 
(0.0080) 
8.6% 
0.0677 
(0.1274) 
91.4% 
Receptionists and information clerks 0.1367 0.0818 
0.0550*** 
(0.0318) 
-0.0244** 
(0.0132) 
-44.4% 
0.0794 
(0.1050) 
144.4% 
Security guards and gaming surveillance 
officers 0.3482 0.2970 
0.0513 
(0.0360) 
0.0147 
(0.0150) 
28.8% 
0.0365 
(0.1050) 
71.2% 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 0.4729 0.4339 
0.0389*** 
(0.0232) 
-0.0366* 
(0.0082) 
-94.1% 
0.0755 
(0.0785) 
194.1% 
Office clerks, general 0.1883 0.1564 
0.0319 
(0.0297) 
-0.0142 
(0.0121) 
-44.4% 
0.0461 
(0.0835) 
144.4% 
Secretaries and administrative assistants 0.0806 0.0521 
0.0286*** 
(0.0172) 
-0.0122** 
(0.0065) 
-42.7% 
0.0408 
(0.0543) 
142.7% 
Janitors and building cleaners 0.3029 0.2811 
0.0217 
(0.0161) 
-0.0059 
(0.0076) 
-27.2% 
0.0276 
(0.0456) 
127.2% 
Elementary and middle school teachers 0.2590 0.2430 
0.0159 
(0.0129) 
0.0191* 
(0.0031) 
119.5% 
-0.0031 
(0.0522) 
-19.5% 
Accountants and auditors -0.0081 -0.0118 
0.0036 
(0.0512) 
-0.0575* 
(0.0195) 
-1580.6% 
0.0611 
(0.0930) 
1680.6% 
Managers, all other -0.0205 -0.0061 
-0.0144 
(0.0445) 
-0.0014 
(0.0180) 
10.0% 
-0.0129 
(0.0798) 
90.0% 
Lawyers, judges, magistrates, and other 
judicial workers -0.0849 -0.0643 -0.0207 NA NA 
Miscellaneous community and social 
service specialists -0.0292 0.0264 -0.0557 NA NA 
First-line supervisors/managers of office 
and administrative support workers 0.0005 0.0720 
-0.0715** 
(0.0314) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.0147) 
38.2% 
-0.0442 
(0.0815) 
61.8% 
Personal and home care aides 0.1538 0.2325 
-0.0787** 
(0.0391) 
0.0344 
(0.0244) 
-43.7% 
-0.1131 
(0.1123) 
143.7% 
Counselors 0.0702 0.1534 
-0.0832*** 
(0.0493) 
-0.0216 
(0.0135) 
26.0% 
-0.0616 
(0.1146) 
74.0% 
Grounds maintenance workers 0.3431 0.4268 
-0.0837*** 
(0.0443) 
-0.0251 
(0.0218) 
30.0% 
-0.0586 
(0.0973) 
70.0% 
Human resources, training, and labor 
relations specialists -0.0578 0.0377 
-0.0956*** 
(0.0532) 
-0.0137 
(0.0273) 
-0.0819 
(0.1008) 
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Table 3:  Differences in Private-Public Sector Union Premiums and Percentages Explained by Differences in Worker 
Characteristics and How Unions Reward Workers in the Private and Public Sectors 
 
Log Union Premium 
Percent of Difference Explained 
By: 
14.3% 85.7% 
Office and administrative support 
workers, all other 0.0409 0.1894 
-0.1485* 
(0.0504) 
-0.0581** 
(0.0243) 
39.1% 
-0.0904 
(0.1073) 
60.9% 
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health 
aides 0.0909 0.2481 
-0.1572* 
(0.0133) 
-0.0185* 
(0.0069) 
11.7% 
-0.1387** 
(0.0623) 
88.3% 
Librarians 0.1066 0.2694 -0.1628 NA NA 
Other teachers and instructors -0.0007 0.4789 
-0.4797* 
(0.0547) 
-0.0377 
(0.0274) 
7.9% 
-0.4419* 
(0.1210) 
92.1% 
Police and sheriff's patrol officers NA 0.2188 NA NA NA 
Postal service mail carriers NA 0.2474 NA NA NA 
Bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers NA 0.1740 NA NA NA 
Fire fighters NA 0.2119 NA NA NA 
Postal service clerks NA 0.2199 NA NA NA 
Postal service mail sorters, processors, 
and processing machine operators NA 0.3325 NA NA NA 
First-line supervisors/managers of police 
and detectives NA -0.0450 NA NA NA 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at the 1 percent level. 
**significant at the 5 percent level. 
***significant at the 10 percent level. 
# Oaxaca decompositions could not be 
performed for some occupations, as the 
private sector did not have observed 
values of some variables.  For example 
all private sector lawyers in unions are in 
metropolitan areas.  Thus, including 
SMSAxUN and UN results in perfect 
collinearity.  When an Oaxaca 
decomposition cannot be performed, the 
table includes NA. 
      
 
Thus, although statistical significance is not achieved in many cases, the findings generally support the idea 
that private-public sector differences in union premiums by occupation are due to differences in the way unions 
reward workers in each sector rather than due to differences in personal characteristics.  That is, public sector 
workers and private sector workers in the same occupation have very similar levels of education and implied 
experience, similar proportions live in metropolitan areas and are full time, similar percentages are black, white, 
male, and female, and they live in similar regions.  However, private and public sector unions reward such 
characteristics differently.  In fact, in 27 out of the 28 occupations where Oaxaca decompositions are possible, at 
least 60 percent of the difference is due to differences in the way unions reward workers for their characteristics in 
the private and public sectors.  In 21 out of the 28 occupations, at least 80 percent of the difference is due to such 
differences. 
 
These findings lead to the question of why private sector unions reward workers differently than public 
sector unions.  Some economists have argued that collective bargaining might be more effective in the public sector 
than private sector (Wellington and Winter 1971; Freeman 1986; Trejo 1991; Valletta 1993; Babcock et al.; Zax and 
Ichniowski 1988).  Their main reasons are that public employers do not have a profit motive and are less resistant to 
union demands, public sector employees can exert political pressure during the election process, and the demand for 
public employees is relatively inelastic.  
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Despite these theoretical arguments, the majority of the empirical findings show that the union wage 
premium for private sector workers exceeds that for public sector workers, which is consistent with our findings.
8
 
The main reasons for these findings are the labor intensive nature of the government services, the low public 
tolerance to pay for government services, the large portion of public sector workers being in the white collar 
occupations, legal restrictions on the right to strike, monopsony power of the government, and the introduction of 
labor saving technologies and outsourcing of some public services. 
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study examines union wage premiums by occupation in the public sector in the U.S.  In examining 
union-nonunion wage differences for public sector workers in occupations accounting for 66 percent of all public 
workers in the 2000-2004 Current Population Survey, we find positive and statistically significant union premiums 
for 27 out of 41 occupations examined.  We also find large differences among occupations, with miscellaneous 
teachers and instructors receiving a 61 percent premium, secretaries and administrative assistants receiving a 5 
percent premium, and 14 occupations receiving no statistically significant premium. 
 
In comparing union premiums by occupation between the private and public sectors, we find that private 
sector premiums are larger than public sector premiums in most cases.  This suggests that the explanation given by 
some studies, that the reason for higher union premiums in the private sector is due to a concentration of public 
sector workers in white collar occupations, is not the primary reason for private-public sector differences in union 
wage premiums.  Rather, the persistently larger union wage premiums in the private sector at the occupation level 
suggest fundamental differences in the effectiveness of unions in the private and public sectors. 
 
Finally, to investigate whether the differences in union premiums paid in the private and public sectors are 
due to differences in worker characteristics or in the way that unions reward workers in both sectors, we perform an 
Oaxaca decomposition of private-public sector union wage premium differentials.  We find that the majority of the 
differential between private sector union premiums and public sector union premiums appears to be due to 
differences in the way unions reward workers in the private and public sectors, not because of differences in the 
types of workers in the private and public sectors.  This further supports the idea of fundamental differences in the 
way unions operate in the private and public sectors. 
 
It should be noted that this study does not address public-private wage differentials.  Although the study 
suggests larger union premiums in the private sector in comparison to the public sector, most existing evidence of 
public-private sector wage differentials suggests that public sector workers receive a premium over their private 
sector counterparts.  While not examined in our study, most of our data also suggest a public sector wage premium 
over the private sector.  Further research should address the public sector wage premium and disentangle the effects 
from union wage premiums in the private and public sectors. 
 
Moreover, our study does not address specific differences in the ways unions reward workers in the private 
and public sectors by occupation.  This would require a detailed Oaxaca decomposition for each of the occupations 
examined. 
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8 Some of these studies are: Freeman and Ichniowski 1988, Lewis 1990, Blanchflower and Bryson 2004, Lewin et al. 1988, 
Lewin 1987, and Mueller 2000.   
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